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Johnston describes Saving God, in a  preface, as ‘the expression of 
a  certain sensibility’ that ‘contains some philosophy but is not a work 
of philosophy’ (p. xi). It is true that the main negative thesis of Saving 
God is the rejection of ‘supernaturalism’, with its conception of God as 
a personal agent who creates the universe ex nihilo and intervenes in its 
history to salvific purpose. And it is also true that, for Johnston, ‘the crux 
of supernaturalist belief ’ is ‘belief in life after death’. For his critique of 
this belief, and thus what he himself counts as his ‘philosophical defence 
of the spiritual irrelevance of supernaturalism’ (p. xi), Johnston directs 
the reader to his subsequent book, Surviving Death.1 It by no means 
follows, however, that Saving God is not a work of philosophy. I found 
reading Saving God an exhilarating experience and I refuse to agree that 
such an unputdownable book is not an authentic work of philosophy! In 
this article, I hope to show, to the contrary, that Saving God should be 
taken seriously as a significant original contribution to the Philosophy of 
religion, even though it may also serve as its author’s spiritual manifesto.
1 mark Johnston, Surviving Death (Princeton, NJ: Princeton university Press, 2010). 
Johnston’s attempt in this book – the Carl G. Hempel lecture series – to provide 
understandings of the self and personal identity that support a purely naturalistic account 
of surviving death is a  work of great philosophical interest. Here, however, I  confine 
myself to discussing Saving God.
176 JoHN bISHoP
Conceptions of God and the fear of idolatry
one source of my exhilaration is Johnston’s focus on what can count as 
an adequate conception of God, while ‘bracketing out’ the question of 
the justifiability of believing that God exists. This is a breath of fresh air 
for debates that simply assume the personal omniGod conception of the 
divine, according to which God is ‘an all-powerful, all-knowing, wholly 
good person (a person without a body) who has created us and our world’.2 
God has, of course, been thought of differently: classical theism conceives 
of God as atemporal, immutable, impassible, necessary and simple, and 
treats talk of God as ‘a’ personal agent as analogical. but many would 
think that whatever can be retained of classical theism must be religiously, 
and not merely metaphysically, adequate: an adequate conception of God 
has to fit the relevant ‘forms of life’. on that score, many would suppose, 
the personal omniGod conception is the best we can do.
A  second occasion for exhilaration, therefore, is that Johnston 
challenges supernaturalist theism on religious grounds. He does this 
by emphasising the fear of idolatry intrinsic to theistic consciousness. 
Not only have the theistic traditions historically used a  ‘rhetoric of 
idolatrousness’ to challenge their rivals, they are also subject to potential 
self-criticism since what they take to be God (‘their god’, with a  small 
‘g’) may not actually be the true God (with a  capital ‘G’). There is no 
privileged access to the knowledge that one believes in God: ‘the best 
thing a believer can say in response to the question “Do you believe in 
God?” is “I can only hope that I do. I can only hope that I actually stand 
in a tradition in which God has genuinely revealed himself ”’ (p. 10).
‘God’, then, is not a proper name, but a descriptive name, a ‘compressed 
title’ (p. 6), and there is a real question whether whatever one takes to 
deserve that title actually deserves it. under his ‘phenomenological 
approach’, Johnston considers whether specific candidates for what we 
might call the ‘God-role’ would, if they existed, be fit to play that role. 
Any such candidate that does not fit that role would then, if it existed, be 
an idol, and worshipping it, whether it existed or not, idolatry.
Characterising the ‘God-role’: the Highest One, who brings salvation
How is this ‘God-role’ to be characterised? Johnston settles on descriptions 
that result from considering what it is that an idol counterfeits – namely, 
2 The description is Plantinga’s (Warranted Christian Belief, (oxford: oxford 
university Press, 2000) , p. 3): ‘omniGod’ connotes the ‘omni-’properties, omnipotent 
(all-powerful), omniscient (all-knowing) and omnibenevolent (all-loving).
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a proper object of worship. God is ‘the most High’ or ‘the Highest one’, 
and the one ‘from whom (or from which) flows our salvation’ (p. 12).
Johnston offers a religiously ‘neutral’ account of salvation as properly 
coming to terms with the ‘large scale structural defects in human life 
that no amount of psychological adjustment or practical success can 
free us from’, including ‘arbitrary suffering, aging (once it has reached 
the corrosive stage), our profound ignorance of our condition, the 
isolation of ordinary self-involvement, the vulnerability of everything 
we cherish to time and chance, and, finally, to untimely death’ (p. 15). 
Properly dealing with these defects requires self-transformation, with the 
development of the theological virtues of faith, hope and love. Johnston 
contrasts such authentic salvation with the ‘spiritual materialism’ that 
simply extends egotistic self-involvement into a  ‘supposedly spiritual 
realm’ (pp. 15-6). Johnston allows that there may be several ‘orientations’ 
– including atheistic ones – that enable one to live authentically while 
neither denying nor resisting the ‘structural defects’ of human existence. 
What he insists upon, though, is that authentic belief in God must be 
such an orientation: for believers ‘the Highest one comes into view, with 
salvific effect’ (p. 16), and does so, as Johnston emphasises at the outset, 
through God’s own self-revelation: ‘God is transcendent; that is, God 
can come into view, if he comes into view at all, only as a result of his 
self-presentation.’ (p. 1)
With this apparatus in place, Johnston’s essay seeks to explain and 
motivate (if not ‘philosophically’ defend) both the negative claim that 
a supernatural being would not be fit for the God-role and a positive, 
‘process panentheistic’, proposal about what would.
The supernatural God as idol?
Consider, first, Johnston’s negative claim. one might complain that 
a  supernatural personal agent is anthropomorphic. That would not 
suffice to show that it could not be the Highest one, however. Some 
degree of anthropomorphism in our understanding of God may be 
inevitable: the question is where to draw the line. Perhaps marcion 
and the Gnostics were right: the Yahweh-character of the Hebrew bible 
cannot be the Highest one given the ruthless tyrannical behaviour he 
sometimes exhibits. And Johnston may be right that the involvement 
of a supernatural God in a ‘demonic mix’ concocted by a priestly caste 
who exercise social control through fear of God’s power over an ‘afterlife’ 
yields idolatrous worship and the ‘spiritual materialism’ that blocks 
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the self-transformation needed for salvation (see pp. 24-5). We may, 
however, conceive of a  perfectly good supernatural personal agent as 
purified of his ancient role as tribal champion, and as granting eternal 
life to all who will receive it. A personal omniGod may thus still be the 
best candidate for the Highest one: what else, after all, apart from truly 
benign supernatural power could liberate us from those ‘large scale 
structural defects’?
Criteria for authentic divinity
As noted, we do not get, in this book, Johnston’s full argument for the 
inevitability of idolatrousness when a supernatural God is worshipped. 
but we do get a  helpful discussion of a  vital methodological issue 
raised by the need to determine whether a  particular god is the true 
God. From where do the relevant criteria arise? Johnston cites Psalm 
82 as ‘set[ting] out a criterion of godliness, a  criterion that in its turn 
applies to the Highest one’. (‘Give justice to the weak and the orphan; 
maintain the right of the lowly and the destitute, rescue the weak and 
the needy; deliver them from the hands of the wicked.’) Johnston then 
aptly asks: ‘but to accept it as a correct criterion, do we not have to take 
the psalm as expressing the view of the Highest one himself? If so, it is 
an enclosed circle, into which we cannot break, unless we have some 
antecedent conception of the Highest one.’ Johnston therefore concludes 
that we must have such a conception: knowledge of the divine – negative 
knowledge, at least – ‘could be the deliverance of some antecedent 
religious sense of things’ (p. 56).
From a theistic perspective an ‘antecedent religious sense of things’ 
would, of course, itself be a gift of God’s grace. but theism standardly 
distinguishes between God’s special revelation and his general 
revelation, and a prior sense of what makes for – or, anyway, falls short of 
– authentic divinity may belong to the latter. Johnston argues that ‘[t] he 
logic of seeing and hearing as makes some antecedent religious sense of 
things a precondition of the revelation of the Highest one. Yes, God is 
transcendent, and so known de re to us only by his revelation; but for that 
revelation to occur, there must be de dicto knowledge of something of the 
nature of the Highest one’ (p. 69). The kind of knowledge presupposed 
seems to be, or, at least, to include moral knowledge – witness the Psalm 
82 criterion, for example, and the reasons for denying that the tribalist 
Yahweh or the God who rules by fear of the loss of eternal reward could 
be the Highest one.
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Counting such moral knowledge as part of God’s general revelation 
appears to depend on that knowledge being widely, even universally and 
innately, held. but, in fact it is not. Yahweh’s tribalist championing of ‘his 
people’ to the point of commanding them to perform acts of genocide 
(see, for example, Joshua 6:20-1) surely was seen as compatible with 
Yahweh’s greatness in the relevant historical context. The idea that ‘God 
has no favourites, but that anybody of any nationality who fears him and 
does what is right is acceptable to him’ (Acts 11:34-5) had to be developed. 
From a theistic perspective, then, much of our moral knowledge must 
ultimately be attributable to God’s special revelation. So perhaps the 
circularity is not easily avoided: perhaps the very knowledge presupposed 
by the possibility of recognising experience as revelatory of the Highest 
one must itself arise from just such experiences of revelation?
Internal criteria of religious falsehood: 
a requirement of substantive rationality?
Purely external criteria for authentic divinity and genuine revelation will 
not be religiously acceptable, so the question is – as Johnston expresses it 
in the title of his Chapter 5 – whether there can be ‘an internal criterion 
of religious falsehood’ (my emphasis). Johnston makes two proposals as 
to how the needed criteria may arise within the religious traditions.
The first is to adopt Pope benedict’s reasoning in his notorious 
regensburg lecture. benedict follows the byzantine emperor manuel II 
in holding that ‘God acts, syn logo, with logos’, where, as the Pope puts 
it, ‘Logos means both reason and word – a reason which is creative and 
capable of self-communication, precisely as reason. John [the evangelist]’, 
the Pope continues, ‘thus spoke the final word on the biblical concept 
of God, and in this word all the often toilsome and tortuous threads of 
biblical faith find their culmination and synthesis’ (quoted by Johnston, 
p. 72). benedict, Johnston explains, ‘interprets Logos as publicly acces-
sible reason understood as an objective constraint on all actual reasoning 
and communication’ (pp. 72-3), and treats ‘the insertion of [this] Greek 
theme ... into biblical faith ... [as] ordained’ – as ‘a new step in the ongoing 
revelation of God’s nature!’ (Johnston’s emphasis, p. 73). ‘From the 
very heart of Christian faith, and at the same time, the heart of Greek 
thought now joined to faith, manuel II was able to say: Not to act “with 
logos” is contrary to God’s nature’ – a  quotation from the Pope again 
(p. 73). We may be sure, then, that trying to spread the faith ‘by the 
sword’ cannot accord with the divine will. Placing God somehow ‘above 
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reason’ is a serious mistake – and one which, as Johnston observes, the 
Pope attributes as much to key thinkers in Protestant Christianity as to 
important strands in Islam.
How robust a criterion of authentically revealed truth do we get from 
accepting ‘that the deliverances of reason are an ineliminable part of the 
full revelation itself ... and have a kind of veto power over other purported 
Judeo-Christian revelations ...’ (p. 75)? Johnston emphasises that the 
rationality here appealed to is substantive rationality, not merely formal 
rationality. Torturing heretics to save their immortal souls (for example) 
does not involve any ‘mistake in mathematical logic’ nor ‘failure to apply 
the canons of decision theory’. ‘Still it is perverse. ... to require torture 
for salvation could not lie in the nature of the Highest one.’ (p. 76) This 
is something we know, Johnston says, ‘by the light of natural reason’. He 
adds: ‘The truly remarkable element in benedict’s lecture is that these 
naturally knowable propositions, propositions known to Plato, Aristotle 
and the Stoics, form part of full Christian revelation, rather than merely 
providing an extraneous criterion for religious falsity.’ (p. 76)
one may sense a conjuring trick here. If the substantive constraints on 
authentic revelation are ‘known by the light of natural reason’, then they 
are external to, and independent of, whatever is claimed to be known 
through special divine revelation. The incorporation of what is known by 
the light of natural reason within an overall theistic epistemology makes 
no difference to that. of course, the theist will need to see ‘revelation 
through natural reason’ as part of God’s general providential dispensation: 
but these constraints will still be an external corrective over what may be 
accepted as specially revealed.
more disturbingly, though, a little reflection casts doubt on the claim 
that it is ‘the light of natural reason’ that makes it clear that the Highest 
one could not will salvation through torture. Patently, it is not the case 
that every properly functioning human agent has accepted the substantive 
irrationality of torturing people for their own supposed ultimate good 
– and Johnston’s discussion, it seems to me, is not sufficiently sensitive 
to this, disconcertingly chilling, fact. our consensus (such that it is) 
that torture is absolutely uncontemplatable is something that has had 
to develop. In general, claims about what is substantively rational are 
in principle contestable and often contested: consider, for instance, the 
Pope’s views on same-sex relations or the use of certain methods of 
contraception. In fact, then, what constrains claims to special revelation 
are moral claims, in so far as they are endorsed. And, although some basic 
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moral claims may be so entrenched – even, perhaps, innately so – that our 
not endorsing them is just not an option (they seem given ‘by the light 
of natural reason’), this, perhaps lamentably, does not apply to claims 
forbidding torture nor the use of violence to spread conformity to ‘the 
true faith’. Nevertheless, we surely do want to say that the endorsement 
of moral claims such as these has vital weight in determining that the 
voice of one who urges torture or violence for noble ends cannot be the 
voice of the most High. but how may such moral constraints be accepted 
from a perspective that rests ultimately on special revelation? Johnston 
has a second proposal for an ‘internal criterion of religious falsehood’ 
that suggests a promising answer.
Discerning authentic divinity: a matter for judgment?
Johnston reminds us that scientific knowledge develops under conditions 
of fallibility. That explains ‘the open-ended and self-critical orientation 
of the best science, in which the practice is not to defend the best theory 
we have so far, but to look for new observations that will falsify [that] 
theory and so force [it] to undergo evolution towards (what we hope is) 
a better approximation to the truth’ (p. 77). Science has an agreed internal 
criterion of the falsity of scientific theories, ‘namely, their implying 
something ultimately at odds with observation’ (p. 77). We may thus, by 
analogy, think of the theistic traditions as developing their knowledge 
of God and God’s will under conditions of fallibility, with their internal 
criterion for the falsity of putative special revelations having, as its germ 
(to use Johnston’s term), the requirement that the one who supposedly 
thereby reveals himself must not be an idol. but where do we obtain the 
criteria relevant to that requirement? Whence arise the criteria of non-
idolatrousness? As we have been arguing, they seem to have to come by 
means of special revelation itself.
The comparison with science shows us that this looming circularity 
need not be vicious. Johnston observes that, ‘as Pierre Duhem famously 
pointed out’, judging whether a given scientific theory meets the internal 
requirement of ‘[not] being ultimately at odds with observation is 
no simple matter’ (pp. 77-8). Given the ineliminability of ‘auxiliary 
hypotheses that bridge the gap between theory, experimental design, 
and human observation’ (p. 78), there is never a pure, unmediated, clash 
between what theory predicts and what is observed. It is a  matter for 
judgment whether any such apparent clash is a genuine counter-instance 
or attributable to some hidden variable that leaves the theory intact. 
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Johnston reports C.G. Hempel as observing that ‘part of the training in any 
given science, and in its characteristic art of generalization, is acquiring 
knowledge, often largely tacit knowledge, of what would count as an 
irrelevant confounding variable, as against a  genuine counterexample’ 
(pp. 78-9). This knowledge, Johnston argues, ‘falls outside the purview 
of any formal theory of induction or probabilistic reasoning’ (p. 79). It is 
knowledge that may be acquired only through the developing collective 
practices of particular sciences. It is neither imposed from outside these 
practices, nor able to be precisely formulated within them. Yet it provides 
real and meaningful constraints on whether given scientific theories are, 
or are not, properly accepted.
Similarly, then, it may be maintained that a long-standing collective 
practice of distinguishing between authentic and spurious revelations 
has developed, and continues to develop, within the theistic religious 
traditions. Johnston does not make this point explicitly, but it does seem 
implied by his comparison with the practice of science. Admittedly, 
Johnston’s notion of an ‘antecedent religious sense of things’ will now 
need to be clarified: there may be no sense of what does and does not 
deserve worship generally antecedent to theistic religion, only a  sense 
of authentic divinity developed within religious traditions that stands 
antecedently to particular claims to special revelation. No such particular 
claims can ever be, baldly, self-certifying.
Discerning authentic divinity: ‘honest ecumenism’ 
and the wider moral consensus
The constraints against idolatry and specious revelation need not, then, 
be imposed on a religious tradition from outside, nor be open to precise 
formulation within it. Yet the required discernment is a  high art, and 
a continually developing one, that belongs to the heart of the tradition. 
As the comparison with the conduct of fallible science may suggest, 
however, wise practitioners of this high art must be catholic in their 
openness to potential sources of improved discernment. For a  start, 
receiving insight from neighbouring Abrahamic traditions should not 
be excluded. Johnston is rightly critical (see pp. 29-33) of a superficial 
ecumenism that too easily proclaims that Jews, Christians and muslims 
worship the same God (as if ‘God’ were an established proper name), 
when each faith affirms distinct and mutually incompatible descriptions 
of Who that God is. but he does allow, I think, an ‘honest ecumenism’ 
(p. 77) that accepts the absolute unity of the Highest one and treats 
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revelations of his Nature as partial and fallible, even when entrenched in 
a specific tradition.
To be truly honest, however, ‘honest ecumenism’ may not limit its 
inclusiveness to the theist traditions – not, anyway, if it is motivated 
by desire to worship ‘in spirit and in truth’. If it is to grow, wisdom in 
discerning idols must take account of (while also, of course, contributing 
to) the widest moral consensus, and be informed by our best scientific 
understandings of human individual and social existence, and by 
compassionate historical understanding, especially of misplaced 
religious or ‘ultimate’ commitment.
Overcoming self-centredness: a feature of the God-role
The need for idol-busters to appeal to our widest moral consensus raises 
the question why commitment to that moral consensus is not good 
enough, without religious trappings. Johnston claims a link between God 
and authentic moral practice by arguing that secular morality lacks an 
account of how humans may be properly ethically motivated. Something 
has to overcome ‘our fallen natures’ (p. 81), ‘the centripetal force of the 
self ’ (p. 82). Johnston offers a notably Pauline and lutheran account of 
our nature as ‘deeply curved in on itself (incurvatus in se)’: ‘each sets 
his own interest up as an overriding principle of his will, so that each is 
really an enemy of the others and the ethical itself ’ (p. 91). but the ethical 
ideal, Johnston argues, is agape, which he identifies as a  life of radical 
altruism, in which ‘the legitimate interests of others, in so far as you can 
anticipate them, will figure on a par with your own legitimate interests in 
your practical reasoning’ (p. 90).
Kant thought that actually achieving the ethical ideal requires 
believing that all and only those deserving happiness ultimately possess 
it – and, therefore, in freedom of the will, immortality, and a God who is 
our judge. but believing in these things, Johnston says, ‘cannot redeem 
us from the condition of being incurvatus in se’ (p. 91). ‘Is it not the case,’ 
Johnston asks, ‘that the existence of a redeemer, a source of grace – that 
is, something transformative entering from outside our fallen natures – is 
also in need of being deduced as another “postulate of practical reason”, 
a  belief required if we are to avoid moral despair?’ (p.  93) Authentic 
moral life would then require openness to such sources of grace – many 
and various as they may be. If the Highest one is ‘to be of salvific 
interest’, Johnston concludes, it must be the ‘common source’ (p. 94) of 
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transformative grace, and submission to it will be necessary if we are to 
live well.
Johnston is surely right in holding, in effect, that moral philosophy 
should concern itself, not only with the content and nature of moral 
ideals, but with the possibility of our really achieving them. Arguably, only 
when this latter question comes in view does the role of religious belief 
in ethical living become clear. redemption may be needed, however, not 
only from individual self-centredness, but also from whatever blocks our 
collectively achieving the highest social and ecological ideals. Collective 
and institutional ‘original sin’ may need to be the focus of a contemporary 
soteriology, and the role of the ‘saving God’ filled by something great 
enough to transform our corporate, political and environmental life.
The search for alternatives to (assumedly) idolatrous supernaturalism
In sum, then, Johnston’s discussion of the fear of idolatry as the spur to 
religious thinking provides a  good basis for a  working account of the 
‘God-role’. Such an account will explain how belief in God functions 
in the religious life, and point the way to religiously acceptable criteria 
of authentic divinity. As noted, Johnston believes that the supernatural 
personal omniGod is an idol – through its entanglement with an economy 
of personal immortality, whose rejection Johnston defends elsewhere. 
but even if an afterlife is, contra Johnston, accessible to us, there may 
still be grounds for rejecting the personal omniGod. It may plausibly 
be argued, for example, that the notion that God is a  personal agent 
who first causally sustains and then wonderfully redeems participants 
in horrendous evils (as depicted, say, in a  sophisticated theodicy such 
as marilyn Adams’s) places God in an overall relationship with created 
persons that cannot be perfectly loving, and so ensures that such a God 
is not the Highest one. let me here set aside, however, the attempt to 
justify the claim that a non-idolatrous God must differ from the personal 
omniGod, and just assume its truth in order to consider Johnston’s 
suggested alternative conception of the divine.
Can there be a naturalist theism?
Johnston rejects supernaturalism. Whatever conception of God he 
favours, then, must be ‘naturalist’ – but in what sense? Theism can  be 
a form of naturalism, Johnston thinks, without succumbing to the ‘scien-
tism’ that interprets God as a postulate in a scientific theory, the egregious 
error of that ‘undergraduate atheist’ Dawkins (p. 38). For science to 
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refute religion, as Dawkins supposes, we would need ‘the singular 
scientific result that there is no authentic source of existential strength’ 
(p. 44). of course, there can be no such result. It is the ‘methodological 
naïveté’ (p. 47) of scientism to forget that natural scientific knowledge 
can achieve its explanatory generality only by abstracting away from the 
more concrete but ‘less tractable aspects of reality’ (p. 46).
If God ‘as authentic source of existential strength’ is real, what 
ontological status does his reality have? If he does not inhabit a separate 
supernatural realm, he must somehow belong to the one ‘natural’ realm. 
What feasible criterion do we have of belonging to the one natural realm, 
however, other than being ultimately describable in physical terms and 
being governed by physical laws? As Johnston puts it, ‘every event will 
admit of a description of its ultimate material constituents in a vocabulary 
that allows those constituents to be brought under the aegis of natural 
laws’ (p. 49). meeting this criterion is quite inclusive: natural ontology 
is not reduced to the bare fundamentals of physical theory, but includes 
biological entities and – on a physicalist view – psychological states and 
events and intentional actions.
Could God belong to the one natural realm according to this 
criterion? Would we not land back in ‘scientism’ if we supposed so? Not 
necessarily, as reflection on the ontology of intentional agency suggests. It 
is arguable that intentional actions are ultimately constituted by complex 
physical events, yet are not the proper object of any natural science, since 
they are explicable by intentional explanations which differ, in their 
implicit normativity, from scientific explanations. The modest claim 
that this Davidsonian view is at least possibly true is enough to show 
that something can belong to the one natural order through its physical 
constitution without necessarily being intelligible within an ideally 
completed natural science. That could also in principle be the case with 
a ‘natural’ God.
Johnston’s process panentheism
Any such naturalist conception may seem inevitably pantheistic. 
However, Johnston’s positive account is, he claims, not a pantheism but 
a ‘process panentheism’. It develops by correcting and building upon the 
view Johnston attributes to Aquinas, of God as ‘“Ipsum esse”, that is being 
or existence Itself ’. Johnston thinks Aquinas understands existence Itself 
as ‘something like a  Platonic eidos’, and takes Tillich to ‘captur[e] the 
same thought’ more concretely with his claim that God is the Ground 
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of our being (see p. 97). This identification of God with existence Itself, 
Johnston says, fits the requirement that God’s existence be a  se. And 
God’s aseity, Johnston thinks, gives rise to Aquinas’s argument for divine 
simplicity: the Highest one is not dependent on anything else, so cannot 
be composite, since it would then depend on its parts and not be a se. 
God’s existence, essence and essential attributes are thus one and the 
same. This paradoxical ‘identity theory of God’s nature’, Johnston argues 
(following Plantinga), ‘entails that God is a single property or attribute’, 
and thus ‘breaks all connection with the monotheistic faiths’ (p. 103). Yet 
Aquinas emphasises that we apply predicates such as ‘good’ and ‘exists’ 
to God analogically. This doctrine of analogical divine predication is 
important, since, as Johnston says, ‘it provides a semantic and cognitive 
framework for any positive thought about God’ (p. 109). Johnston argues, 
however, that this doctrine clashes with the ‘identity theory of God’s 
nature’ to which he thinks Thomas is committed: God’s goodness, not his 
existence, is analogous to creaturely goodness; and God’s existence, not his 
goodness, is analogous to creaturely existence; therefore, God’s existence 
and God’s goodness are not the same. Johnston concludes: ‘if I have not 
distorted Thomas’s intentions too much, we have here a profound flaw in 
Thomas’s profound theology of existence Itself ’ (p. 110).
but, arguably, Johnston has distorted Thomas’s theology. So far 
from being inconsistent with it, the need for analogical predication 
may actually be entailed by divine simplicity! That is so, anyway, if 
divine simplicity (that is, along with other classical divine attributes) is 
understood apophatically – as affirming that God is not composite in the 
way in which a  substance is ‘composite’ (through being the subject of 
attributes, and the instantiation of an essence). The message is that God 
is logically in a different category from beings and their properties, and 
that is why analogical use of predicates is needed for meaningful, though 
limited, knowledge of God.3
Johnston does nevertheless agree that God is not in the logical 
category of substance. For Johnston, God belongs to the category of 
activity. rejecting divine simplicity – and atemporality and immutability 
along with it – Johnston proposes that the Highest one be identified 
with ‘the outpouring of existence Itself by way of its exemplification in 
3 I  am much indebted to Thomas Harvey (personal communication, and in 
conversation) for this perspective on Aquinas’s doctrine of simplicity and its relation to 
his doctrine of divine analogical predication.
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ordinary existents’ (p. 113). The Highest one is thus, he says, ‘a certain 
kind of activity that could be analogically described as loving, for it is 
the self-giving outpouring of existence Itself ...’ (my emphasis, p. 113). He 
then specifies the purpose of this ‘outpouring’: ‘The Highest one = the 
outpouring of existence Itself by way of its exemplification in ordinary 
existents for the sake of the self-disclosure of Existence Itself’ (my emphasis, 
p. 116). This account is panentheistic because it shows God to be ‘wholly 
constituted by the natural realm[, but] ... numerically distinct ... by 
virtue of having this different form’ (p. 127), that is, the form specified 
on the right hand side of the above identity. It is a process panentheism 
because the divine is not an abstract eidos, but concrete activity. And it 
is a naturalist theology because it accepts that the domain of the natural 
sciences is complete on its own terms: every causal transaction ultimately 
consists in some wholly natural process.
Could loving God be ‘affirming existence’?
Some will urge that taking God to be ‘wholly constituted by the natural 
realm’ is, by definition, pantheistic. While there’s no point disputing over 
a term, the usual theist complaint about pantheism is salient – namely, 
mistaking the creative activity of the divine for the divine itself. Johnston 
holds the outpouring of existence Itself to be divine: but won’t that 
activity depend on its agent, and so existence Itself be a fitter candidate 
for the Highest one? or do we have here, uniquely, an activity that is 
ontologically prior to its agent?
What is ‘existence Itself ’, the supposed agent here? Presumably 
Johnston continues to use the term in the Platonic sense he (questionably) 
attributes to Aquinas. but, then, what is the difference between, say, 
a gnat’s existing exemplifying existence and existence outpouring Itself 
in the exemplification which is the existing gnat? And how could the 
outpouring of existence in the gnat – together with its outpouring in 
absolutely every ordinary existent throughout all time and space – be 
worthy of worship, and trustworthy for salvation from the ‘large-scale 
existential defects’ Johnston lists?
Johnston claims that the outpouring of existence Itself ‘seems well 
suited to command total affirmation by one’s will’, and adds that ‘[i]t is 
a process that makes up all of reality, and, arguably, to affirm this process 
and thoroughly identify with it is to truly love God’ (p. 116). ‘Affirming’ 
and ‘identifying with’ existence seem to amount to accepting that what 
is, is. Such acceptance – especially when directed upon the awesome 
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vastness of the universe as a whole – may in some shatter the selfishness 
of homo incurvatus in se, though equally, in others, it may generate 
feelings of meaninglessness and despair. After all, every ordinary existent 
will, on this view, be a manifestation of the divine outpouring, including 
the horrific sufferings of sentient animals. With such existents, it takes 
a  stretch to ‘analogise’ existence’s outpouring ‘as loving’, or to give 
them ‘total affirmation by one’s will’. Certainly, it is a part of a  theist’s 
orientation not to be ‘in denial’ about what is, including the reality of 
gratuitous suffering – but surely there is more to the ‘love of God’ than 
such acceptance?
God’s goodness and the divine purpose
How, then, does God, understood as the outpouring of being, count as 
good and powerfully able to save? Just before proposing that God is, not 
existence Itself, but existence’s outpouring, Johnston notes that ‘Aquinas 
explains the goodness of God as God’s being eminently desirable, 
desirable in a  way that is more complete and coherent than the way 
in which any other object of desire could be desirable’. Thus, he adds, 
‘God can be said (analogically, of course) to rightly command the total 
affirmation of his nature by our wills’ (p. 115). This does not fit, however, 
with attributing to Aquinas the Platonic view that God is existence Itself 
– as Johnston himself remarks: ‘[h]ow could an unchanging eidos be 
maximally desirable?’ (p. 116) rather, in this account of divine goodness, 
Aquinas seems to place God in the category of ends – which fits both 
with Aquinas’s view that God is his goodness, and with his counting as 
analogical and transcategorial the predication of ‘commanding’ to God. 
Johnston, however, does not follow this clue, choosing rather to amend 
the ‘existence Itself ’ account by emphasising its activity. Why that 
should yield something ‘maximally desirable’ is unclear, however: the 
outpouring of existence just happens, it hardly makes sense to desire it 
(what we desire is that existence should ‘outpour’ in certain ways rather 
than others).
Johnston’s conception of the Highest one does have a  teleological 
element, however, and this may be, perhaps, the key to understanding 
Johnston’s account of divine goodness. For Johnston, the outpouring 
of existence Itself has a  point, namely its own self-disclosure, and, in 
particular, its self-disclosure to us. Johnston calls this the ‘“doubly 
donatory” character of reality’ (p. 156): ‘First, I am an expression of being 
Itself, ... Second, all of THIS is made available to me, gratis.’ (pp. 156-7) 
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If this account of the divine purpose seems too anthropocentric, we may 
allow (as I think Johnston would) that other sentient and cognising beings 
also receive existence’s disclosure. but disclosure to humanity is essential 
to the theist traditions: ‘ ... the Highest one’, Johnston says ‘does not want 
us to be just in him, as elements in his reality; the Highest one wants us 
to be with him’, where ‘being with him’ amounts to ‘participat[ing] in his 
own self-disclosure’ (p. 116).
To understand our participation in the self-disclosure of the Highest 
one, Johnston maintains, we must reject ‘representationalist’ philosophy 
of mind as ‘... blindness to the gift, a profoundly impious theft, an attempt 
to appropriate to oneself the source of intelligibility’ (pp. 127-8). Johnston 
summarises his positive view thus: ‘All the manners of presentation or 
disclosure of things, all the ways of thinking of them, and experiencing 
them, come with the things themselves. What we call an individual 
consciousness is no more than a particular history of sampling from this 
vast realm, a history of accessing manners of presentation.’ (my emphasis, 
p. 152) This ‘vast realm’ Johnston describes, following Frege, as ‘the realm 
of sense’, ‘the totality of objective modes of presentation’, or ‘objective 
mind’ (p. 154). Now, if our ‘experience of presence’ is a sampling from 
what is already there, objective mind must include inadequate and partial 
modes of presentation – otherwise illusory experience would, on this 
model, be impossible. Johnston grasps this nettle, accepting a hierarchy 
of modes of presentation, according to how accurate and complete they 
are. In the course of evolution, he thinks, minds first access primitive and 
limited modes of presentation, but gradually ascend to more adequate 
modes. ‘[A]t the idealized limit of deepening understanding,’ he says, ‘we 
would come to grasp those modes of presentation of reality that are fully 
adequate and complete, and so reveal the nature of what they present. 
In this sense, we would be conforming our minds to the Divine mind, 
which may be construed as the totality of fully adequate and complete 
modes of presentation of reality.’ (p. 155)
one may have more or less sympathy with Johnston’s acknowledged 
Heideggerian theme here – namely, of the need to overcome ‘a historic 
forgetfulness of being-making-itself-present’ (see pp. 128-9). but the 
contrast between minds as ‘producers of presence’ and as ‘samplers 
of presence’ seems a  false one: consciousness depends, surely, both 
on the cogniser and on the object? And Johnston’s idea that modes 
of presentation may constrain the evolution of conscious beings (see 
p. 154) seems suspect. The objective structure of modes of presentation 
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is surely counterfactual (that is, the existence of a  particular mode is 
the existence of that which would appear thus and so to a certain sort 
of perceiver/cogniser suitably related to it). What objective modes of 
presentation there are, then, seems to depend conceptually on what 
forms of consciousness are possible, and that is determined by causal 
factors governing the development of the kinds of physical complexity 
from which consciousness can emerge.
A deeper concern arises from the need to connect Johnston’s account 
of the purpose of the outpouring of existence Itself with the Highest 
one’s status as perfectly good, and powerful to save. Taking it to be self-
disclosure may yield too passive and insufficiently practical an account of 
our participation in the divine purpose. And this account of the purpose 
seems too thin: ‘sampling’ modes of presentation, at least when they are 
accurate and complete, is a good, but it is not the whole of the good. As 
well, there is the problem of evil as it arises on Johnston’s model. Some 
experiences of presence are experiences of serious suffering, but it is far 
from clear that they must, just for that reason, count as inadequate or 
incomplete, and so, disturbingly, there may not be anything on Johnston’s 
account to prevent their belonging to the Divine mind. Arguably, then, 
what Johnston takes the object of theistic worship to be, though it may 
be shorn of the idolatrous features of a supernatural God, is yet unfit to 
count as authentic divinity.
What appears missing from – or insufficiently accented in – Johnston’s 
account, I suggest, is that divine self-disclosure needs to be for the sake 
of revealing and achieving the Good, and our participation in the divine 
needs to include our participation in that ethically supreme practical 
work. To qualify as the Highest one, then, the outpouring of existence 
Itself would have to be ultimately for the sake of realising the Good, 
and enabling our participation in the Good through overcoming our 
fallenness and giving grounds for hope that commitment to the Good is 
indeed ultimately important. Furthermore, the Good must belong to the 
nature of the Highest one, otherwise its status as such is undermined by 
its seeking and serving what it itself lacks.
Conclusion: other options?
In Saving God Johnston brilliantly brings the quest for authentic divinity 
into the heart of philosophical thinking about theism, demonstrating the 
importance of the epistemology of discriminating the gold of God-hood 
from the glister of idols. Whether Johnston hits gold with his own positive 
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account of divinity as the outpouring, self-disclosing, activity of existence 
Itself in ordinary existents may be doubted, however. As I have in effect 
been suggesting, the worship of the outpouring of existence may yet be 
an idolatry, albeit more pleasingly refined and austere than the idolatry of 
spiritual materialism that may beset personal omniGod theism.
Where should we look, then – those of us who agree that the super-
natural omniGod, taken with metaphysical seriousness, is indeed an 
idol? There are some hints of alternatives to his ‘official’ position in 
Johnston’s discussion. Consider, for example, his urging those who ‘quest 
for meaning’ to ‘[l]ook instead to the self-disclosure of the Highest one 
as outpouring life, Intelligibility and love, and find your life-ordering 
demands there’ (p. 179). God as outpouring Love, I suggest, may connote 
more than the ‘self-giving’ of existence Itself, found in all existents, which 
Johnston earlier (p. 113) describes as ‘loving’, using what is surely a rather 
weak analogy. Can there be a  ‘God is love’ theology, further removed 
from pantheism than Johnston’s version of the theology of being?
A  further, related, alternative is to try to do fuller justice than 
Johnston does to the teleological aspects of theism. God may be the 
supreme Good itself, the ultimate telos of our existence, revealed as love. 
If this account is to avoid reducing God to an abstract supreme ideal, it 
will need – somehow! – to explain how God, the Goal of existence, can 
also, as Creator, be the Source of all that is, and, furthermore, the Saving 
enabler of our actually reaching the Goal.
There is, of course, an underlying issue to be considered: may idolatry 
be inherent in the very ambition to understand authentic divinity by 
completing an identity of the form, ‘The Highest one = ...’? Perhaps any 
claim intellectually to grasp the divine nature is ipso facto idolatrous? 
That thought motivates the view that our theology can only be negative, 
apophatic. but if a purely apophatic theology is unsatisfactory, and for 
reasons better than our ‘fallen’ desire to ‘get things clear’ on our own 
terms, there remains an important question about how non-hubristic 
understanding of the positive nature of the Highest one can be possible, 
and what general form it may properly take.
